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ABSTRACT
Most previous research tests market efficiency and asset pricing models using average abnormal
trading profits on dynamic trading strategies, and typically rejects the joint hypothesis. In contrast,
we measure the ability of a simple risk model and the efficient-market hypothesis to explain the
level of stock prices. First, we find that cash-flow betas (measured by regressing firms' earnings on
the market's earnings) explain the prices of value and growth stocks well, with a plausible premium.
Second, we use a present-value model to decompose the cross-sectional variance of firms' price-to-
book ratios into two components due to risk-adjusted fundamental value and mispricing. When we


















Most previous research uses average abnormal trading profits on dynamic trading strategies to test 
market efficiency and asset pricing models.  The joint hypothesis of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
and market efficiency is typically rejected by these tests.  The economic significance of these rejections is 
usually evaluated based on Sharpe ratios (average return over return standard deviation) of zero-investment 
strategies that do not expose the investor to systematic risks.  The discovery of economically high Sharpe 
ratios has lead many to reject the CAPM and efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) as a good approximate 
description of the stock market.
1 
We argue that asset pricing models and market efficiency should be evaluated by their ability to 
explain stock-price levels, not by their ability to explain the average returns on frequently-rebalanced 
dynamic trading strategies.  The price-level criterion is superior to the Sharpe-ratio criterion for the 
following reasons.  First, although available Sharpe ratios are clearly the main object of interest to a 
professional money manager, the level of price is more relevant to most other economic decision makers.  
For example, a corporate manager making a large long-term investment decision cannot engage in a dynamic 
trading strategy of investing or divesting a small fraction every month, depending on stock-market 
conditions.  Thus, if the price is approximately “right,” the impact of the stock market to his/her investment 
decisions is also likely to be consistent with market efficiency, and the high available Sharpe ratios only an 
interesting side show. 
Second, tests of market efficiency that are based on trading profits typically use high-frequency return 
covariances or betas to adjust for risk.  Although such a practice is consistent with jointly testing a sharp null 
                                                           
 
1 Fama (1970, 1991) surveys the empirical literature on testing market efficiency.  Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) survey the recent evidence on trading strategies that would have produced abnormal profits and 
high Sharpe ratios.  Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) show that in a frictionless rational-expectations model, available 
Sharpe ratios are related to the variability of marginal utility.  MacKinlay (1995) argues that the Sharpe ratios of some 
trading strategies, if taken at face value, are too large to be explained by a rational multifactor model.  Shleifer (2000, p. 
8) characterizes the impact of this evidence on the views of finance academicians: “We have learned a lot, and what we 
think now is quite a bit different from what we thought we knew in 1978.  Among the many changes of views, the 
increased skepticism about market efficiency stands out.”     
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hypothesis of an asset pricing model and market efficiency, it is less appropriate for measuring the impact of 
mispricing on average returns or prices.  If markets are even slightly inefficient, mispricing may contaminate 
not only average returns but also measures of risk, as argued by Brainard, Shapiro, and Shoven (1991).  The 
price-level tests we advocate connect stock prices to covariances or betas of cash flows.  Regressing prices 
on cash-flow betas is a cleaner way to measure a model’s explanatory power than regressing average returns 
on return betas, because the cash-flow betas are less affected by mispricing. 
We test empirically the ability of the CAPM and EMH to explain the stock-price levels of low-price-
to-book “value” stocks and high-price-to-book “growth” stocks.  Our empirical tests concentrate on price-to-
book-sorted portfolios for the following reasons.  First, the average returns generated by value-minus-growth 
strategies (that buy value and short growth stocks) cannot be explained by CAPM betas measured from high-
frequency returns (Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Fama and French, 1992; and others).  Furthermore, 
the pricing errors are highly economically significant when the Sharpe-ratio criterion is used as the metric of 
economic significance (MacKinlay, 1995).  Second, Fama and French (1995) and Cohen, Polk, and 
Vuolteenaho (2002) show that a firm’s price-to-book ratio is a persistent variable that forecasts the returns 
on the firm’s stock far in the future and that the return predictability related to price-to-book ratios has a 
large price-level effect.  Thus, price-to-book-sorted portfolios have the potential of being significantly 
mispriced by the price-level criterion as well. 
Our empirical results suggest that mispricing relative to the CAPM is not an important factor in 
determining the prices of value and growth stocks.  Cash-flow betas (measured by regressing a firm’s 
profitability on the market’s profitability) essentially explain the prices of and long-horizon returns on price-
to-book-sorted portfolios, with a premium that is high but not implausible (8-12 percent per annum).   
Furthermore, the premium on cash-flow beta remains high when we include beta-sorted or size-sorted 
portfolios in the set of test assets, suggesting that the cash-flow beta is not merely proxying for the price-to-
book characteristic. 
In addition to traditional regressions of prices and long-horizon average returns on betas, we specify a 
stochastic-discount-factor present-value model that links firms’ current price-to-book ratios to expected 
future cash flows and to covariances of future cash flows with the stochastic discount factor.  If we restrict 
discount rates to be constant across firms, our present-value model allocates more than 25 percent of the 
cross-sectional price-to-book variance to mispricing.   However, if we allow the discount rates to vary as  
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predicted by the CAPM and measure risk as cash-flow covariances, the variance share of mispricing is 
reduced to near zero.  The share of mispricing is reduced because our present-value model detects more 
systematic risk in value firms’ future cash flows than in growth firms’.  
Previous results by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), 
and others suggest that value stocks have lower, not higher, CAPM betas than growth stocks.  We thus 
expect the above seemingly contradictory results obtained with our cash-flow-beta regressions and 
stochastic-discount-factor methodology to be treated with healthy skepticism.  To reconcile our results with 
those in the previous literature, we examine the long-run and short-run behavior of the average returns on 
and stock-return betas of price-to-book-sorted portfolios.  
We form ten equal-weight portfolios by combining the same-rank value-weight deciles from N 
different sorts on t-1 to t-N price-to-book ratios.  Much as in event studies that use the calendar-time 
methodology, these portfolios approximate the N-year investor experience of investing in value and growth 
stocks, and can be used as test assets in standard Black-Jensen-Scholes (1972) or Gibbons-Ross-Shanken 
(1989) time-series asset-pricing tests.  Consistent with the results of Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) 
and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), we find that growth stocks have higher CAPM betas than 
value stocks during the first year after portfolio formation.  Because the betas of these portfolios are 
negatively related to their expected returns, the CAPM fails to explain the returns of value and growth stocks 
during the first year subsequent to portfolio formation.   
Our novel finding is that value stocks’ betas sharply increase and growth stocks’ betas sharply 
decrease after portfolio formation.  Within five years from portfolio formation, value stocks’ (three lowest 
price-to-book deciles) betas have increased to approximately 1.07 and growth stocks’ (three highest price-to-
book deciles) betas have declined to approximately 0.94.  Our tests detect continuation of this trend for 
fifteen years after the sort.  Thus, the lower long-run risk of growth stocks that is detected from cash flows 
by our ROE regressions and present-value model can also be detected from long-horizon stock returns. 
Are these changes in betas sufficient to explain the substantial long-run return spread, as our present-
value model suggests?  An answer from a return-based asset-pricing test is yes.  Consistent with our present-
value model’s results, the CAPM (with betas measured from stock returns over a long horizon) explains an 
awe-inspiring 70 percent of the substantial variation in average returns at the fifteen-year investment 
horizon.  Furthermore, this R
2 is obtained with a reasonable beta premium estimate of 9.4 percent per year.  
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Although we do not confine ourselves to any specific model, there are a number of economic models 
that would predict that the investors’ marginal utility is strongly negatively related to news about aggregate 
cash flows.  For example, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2003) build on our empirical findings and propose a 
version of Merton’s (1973) intertemporal asset pricing model that links expected returns to return 
covariances with market-wide cash-flow news.  In their model, controlling for the cash-flow beta, stock 
return beta has an extremely small risk price. 
Our finding that the CAPM in conjunction with market efficiency provides a good approximate 
description of the level of stock prices has important implications.  For example, our results justify 
corporations’ current use of the CAPM in capital budgeting, documented by Graham and Harvey (2001), as 
most long-term investment decisions depend upon the level of net present value instead of near-term 
expected returns.  Similarly, the higher long-run risk of value stocks also explains why low-priced value 
stocks are not immediately acquired by healthier companies, or bought out by a sophisticated buy-and-hold 
investor, such as Berkshire Hathaway or an LBO fund.   
These findings also rationalize an apparent contradiction in MBA curriculums: Investment courses 
teach that beta is dead, and then corporate finance classes proceed to use the CAPM in firm or project 
valuation.  Our price-level results justify this distinction – the CAPM fails to explain the one-period expected 
returns on some dynamic trading strategies but gets stock prices and expected long-term returns 
approximately right.  Researchers should likewise resentence beta from death row to probation in those 
analyses where firms’ stock prices (rather than returns on trading strategies) are the objects of interest. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the data.  Section II links 
cash-flow betas to price-to-book ratios.  Section III uses a present-value formula to test the CAPM’s ability 
to explain the cross-section of price-to-book ratios.  Section IV presents portfolio-return evidence.  Section V 
examines the robustness of our results to including risk-sorted portfolios in the set of test assets.  Section VI 
concludes. 
I.  Data  
The basic U.S. data come from the merger of three databases.  The first one of these, the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly stock file, contains monthly prices, shares outstanding, 
dividends, and returns for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.  The second database, the COMPUSTAT  
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annual research file, contains the relevant accounting information for most publicly traded U.S. stocks.  The 
COMPUSTAT accounting information is supplemented by the third database, Moody’s book equity 
information collected by Davis, Fama, and French (2000).
2  The basic merged data cover the period 1928-
2000. In the merged data set, the panel contains 208,804 firm-years.  Table I Panel A shows descriptive 
statistics of the data. 
Detailed data definitions are the following.  Book equity is defined as stockholders’ equity, plus 
balance sheet deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208) (if 
available), plus post-retirement benefit liabilities (data item 330) (if available) minus the book value of 
preferred stock.  Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56), liquidation (data item 10), or 
par value (data item 130) (in that order) for the book value of preferred stock.   We calculate stockholders’ 
equity used in the above formula as follows.  We prefer the stockholders’ equity number reported by 
Moody’s, or COMPUSTAT (data item 216).  If neither one is available, we measure stockholders’ equity as 
the book value of common equity (data item 60) plus the par value of preferred stock.  (Note that the 
preferred stock is added at this stage because it is later subtracted in the book equity formula.)  If common 
equity is not available, we compute stockholders’ equity as the book value of assets (data item 6) minus total 
liabilities (data item 181), all from COMPUSTAT.   
The price-to-book ratio used to form portfolios in May of year t is book common equity for the fiscal 
year ending in calendar year t-1, divided by market equity at the end of May of year t.  We require the firm 
to have a valid past price-to-book ratio.  Moreover, in order to eliminate likely data errors, we discard those 
firms with price-to-book ratios less than 0.01 and greater than 100.  When using COMPUSTAT as our 
source of accounting information, we require that the firm must be on COMPUSTAT for two years.  This 
requirement alleviates most of the potential survivor bias due to COMPUSTAT backfilling data.  After 
imposing these data requirements, the cumulative number of firms sorted into portfolios is 165,945.  The 
annual panel spans the period 1928-1999; note that in our timing convention, the 1928 data is computed by 
using book values from the end of 1927 and returns through May 1929. 
                                                           
 
2 We thank Kenneth French for providing us with the data.  
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After portfolio formation, we follow the portfolios for fifteen years while holding the portfolio 
definitions constant.  Because we perform a new sort every year, our final annual data set is three 
dimensional: the number of portfolios formed in each sort times the number of years we follow the portfolios 
times the time dimension of our panel.  
Missing data are treated as follows.  If a stock was included in a portfolio but its book equity is 
temporarily unavailable at the end of some future year t, we assume that the firm’s book-to-market ratio has 
not changed from t-1 and compute the book-equity proxy from the last period’s book-to-market and this 
period’s market equity.  We treat negative or zero book-equity values as missing.  We then use this book-
equity figure in computing clean-surplus earnings.  We follow standard practice and substitute zeros for 
CRSP missing returns, as long as the firm is not delisted.  For market equity, we use the latest available 
figure. 
We deal with delisting firms as follows.  First, we compute the stock return, profitability, and the exit 
price-to-book ratio for the firm at the end of its delisting year.  We use delisting data, when available on the 
CRSP tapes, in computing the stock returns and the exit market value.  In some cases, CRSP records 
delisting prices several months after the security ceases trading and thus after a period of missing returns.  In 
these cases, we calculate the total return from the last available price to the delisting price and pro-rate this 
return over the intervening months.  If a firm is delisted but the delisting return is missing, we investigate the 
reason for disappearance.  If the delisting is performance-related, we assume a -30 percent delisting return.
3  
Otherwise, we assume a zero delisting return. 
Second, we take the delisting market value of the firm and invest it in another firm that was originally 
sorted into the same portfolio as the disappearing firm.  Among the firms in the same portfolio, we pick the 
one that has a current price-to-book ratio closest to the exit price-to-book ratio of the disappearing firm. 
                                                           
 
3 The delisting-return assumptions follow Shumway’s (1997) results.  Shumway tracks a sample of firms whose 
delisting returns are missing from CRSP and finds that performance-related delistings are associated with a significant 
negative return, on average approximately -30  percent.  This assumption is unimportant to our final results, however.  
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Table I Panel B shows averages of selected variables for the price-to-book-sorted decile portfolios.  
Firms with low price-to-book ratios have on average higher subsequent stock returns than firms with high 
price-to-book ratios (Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Fama and French, 1992; and others).  For a five-
year buy-and-hold strategy, the 10-1 difference in average cumulative return is approximately 70 percent.  
Simultaneously, differences in firms’ price-to-book ratios are also related to differences in future average 
growth.  High-price-to-book firms grow faster and are persistently more profitable than low-price-to-book 
firms.  
II.  Do cash-flow betas explain stock-price levels? 
Previous research finds that CAPM betas have essentially no explanatory power with respect to 
average returns generated by annually rebalanced value-minus-growth strategies, if betas are measured from 
high-frequency stock returns.  In this section, we measure CAPM betas from firms’ cash flows and find that 
these cash-flow betas largely explain the prices of and long-run average returns on value and growth stocks. 
We define the cash-flow beta as the regression coefficient of a firm’s discounted log ROE on the 
market portfolio’s discounted log ROE: 
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Above,  ROE  denotes the ratio of clean-surplus earnings (
gross
t t t t D BE BE X + − = −1 ) to beginning-of-the-
period book equity ( 1 − t BE ), with subscript k corresponding to the firm or portfolio under scrutiny and 
subscript M to the market portfolio.  The second subscript refers to the year of observation and the third to 
the number of years from the sort.  
gross
t D  is gross dividends computed from the difference between CRSP 
returns and returns excluding dividends.  ρ  is a constant related to one minus the average dividend yield.  
We set  ρ  to 0.95 in our regressions. 
This measure of cash-flow risk can be motivated with the price-to-book decomposition used by 
Vuolteenaho (2001) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2002).  This decomposition shows that, to a very 
close approximation, 


























ρ ρ . (2) 
Above,  BE ME/  denotes the price-to-book ratio and R the (net) return on a firm’s stock.    
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Over an infinite horizon, the unexpected realizations of the first (ROE) term are equal to the 
unexpected realizations of the second (stock-return) term for every sample path.  Thus measuring the risk 
from either infinite-horizon discounted log returns or profitabilities will necessarily yield the same result.  
However, if the sums in (2) are evaluated over a finite horizon, the covariances of the first and second term 
with a risk factor may be different.  Furthermore, if the stock market is potentially inefficient, mispricing 
may contaminate not only the average returns but also short-horizon return covariances.  (Alternatively, 
expected-return variation due to omitted risk factors may have a large impact on high-frequency return 
covariances and de-link the cash-flow and stock-return covariances.)  Thus, measuring CAPM risks from the 
cash-flow term of (2) instead of the return term may result in a cleaner risk measure. 
Table II Panel A measures the cash-flow betas for ten price-to-book-sorted portfolios.  The columns 
two to eleven correspond to price-to-book-sorted portfolios and rows to selected horizons N.  The 
regressions are estimated from overlapping observations using OLS.  We use Newey-West (1987) standard-
error formulas, which correct for the cross-sectional and time dependence of the residuals, with N leads and 
lags. 
The first row of Table II Panel A shows the one-year cash-flow betas of value and growth stocks 
immediately after the sort.  Apart from the highest price-to-book decile, the cash-flow betas of the stocks in 
our sample line up nicely with their price-to-book ratios: The second-highest price-to-book decile has a cash-
flow beta of 0.85 and the lowest price-to-book decile a cash-flow beta of 1.35.  The highest price-to-book 
decile has a cash-flow beta of 1.00, which is slightly higher than expected. 
Moving down the rows of Table II Panel A and increasing the horizon to five years further 
strengthens the results.  The highest price-to-book portfolio now has the lowest cash-flow beta and the 
lowest price-to-book portfolio the highest cash-flow beta for all horizons from two to fifteen years.  The 
differences are economically significant: Five-year cash-flow beta of the extreme decile of growth stocks is 
0.67 and that of the extreme decile of value stocks is 1.68.  The mean reversion and noise in covariances 
attenuates this difference in betas at the ten and fifteen-year horizons, but the spread remains economically 
significant (0.90 vs. 1.47 and 0.94 vs. 1.21, respectively).   
Columns twelve and thirteen of Table II Panel A show the cash-flow betas of “high-minus-low” 
portfolios.  Column twelve shows the difference in cash-flow betas between the highest and lowest price-to-
book deciles, and column twelve between top three and bottom three.  The difference in cash-flow betas is  
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statistically significant for both differences at all horizons, except for the one-ten difference at the one-year 
horizon.  Thus there is statistical evidence of value stocks’ cash-flow betas being higher than growth stocks’. 
Note that when measuring the cash-flow betas of price-to-book-sorted portfolios, our definition of 
cash-flow beta is likely to result in an upward bias for growth and a downward bias for value stocks.  This is 
because the book-equity data are contaminated with measurement error that affects the ROE levels, and the 
sort disproportionately selects negative-measurement-error firms to the high-price-to-book portfolio and 
positive-measurement-error firms to the low-price-to-book portfolio.  In the ROE formula, value stocks’ 
earnings are divided by an artificially high number and growth stocks’ by an artificially low number, scaling 
the covariances against our finding reported in Table II Panel A. 
To show that the cash-flows of value stocks are unarguably riskier than those of growth stocks, Table 
II Panel B shows cash-flow betas measured using beta definitions proposed in previous research.  (We only 
show the results for the five-year horizon, at which our preferred definition is most successful, to save 
space.)  Our general conclusion from the tests using alternative cash-flow-beta definitions is that our results 
are robust to variations in the cash-flow-beta definition. 
Row one of Table II Panel B shows cash-flow betas measured as in formula (1), except using ROE  in 
place of  ) 1 log( ROE + .  Not surprisingly, the spread in cash-flow betas remains strong and statistically 
significant. 
Rows two to four use cash-flow-beta measures similar to those suggested by Ball and Brown (1969) 
and Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970).  These measures normalize earnings by lagged market value instead 
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Definition (a) in equation (3) is similar to our discounted ROE formula, except that earnings are normalized 
by market value instead of book value.  Definition (b) normalizes the discounted N-year sum of earnings 
with the market value at the time of portfolio formation.  Definition (c) proxies for cash-flows with the N- 
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year change in annual earnings and normalizes with the market value at the time of portfolio formation.  If 
the market is efficient, these measures in equation (3) have the advantage of normalizing with a 
measurement-error-free value metric, market capitalization, thus avoiding the bias resulting from the use of 
error-ridden book values.  However, they do have the disadvantage of containing market values, and thus 
may be influenced by mispricing.  Empirically, rows two to four show that these measures induce a large 
spread in value and growth stocks betas, and this spread is consistent with value stocks’ cash flows being 
much riskier than those of growth stocks. 
Our final cash-flow beta measure is motivated by Campbell and Shiller’s (1988) dividend-growth 
model.  This beta measure is generated by regressing the portfolio’s discounted N-year sum of log dividend 
growth rates ( d ∆ ) on the market’s: 
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To mitigate potential outlier problems (some portfolios occasionally pay zero or near-zero dividends), we 
censor the log dividend growth rates to the interval  )] 5 log( ), 5 / 1 [log( .  The beta measure in equation (4) has 
the advantage of being directly related to the cash flows to investors, but the disadvantages of being 
dependent on largely arbitrary dividend policies of firms.  Furthermore, since gross dividends are never 
negative, for low values of N this risk measure is likely to be a poor one for both extreme growth stocks 
(high growth companies that currently need external financing) and extreme value stocks (distress 
companies that currently cannot afford to pay dividends).  Empirically, row five of Table II Panel B shows 
that this risk measure induces a slightly smaller but still economically significant spread in cash-flow betas.    
Columns fourteen to sixteen of Table II Panel A measure how well the cash-flow betas defined in 
equation (1) explain the prices of value and growth stocks.  The dependent variable in the pricing regressions 
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where  E ˆ  denotes the sample mean and 
CF
k , 1 ˆ β  the estimated cash-flow beta.  The dependent variable of (5) 
can be motivated as a price-level measure.  Reorganizing (2) and taking conditional expectation yields: 


























t t R E ROE E BE ME ρ ρ . (6)  
 11
The expected discounted long-horizon return equals the negative of log price (the first term) plus log book 
value adjusted for the expected cash-flow growth (second term).  The dependent variable of regression (5) 
differs from this price-level metric due to the finite horizon and choice between log and simple returns.  In 







j ρ to annual-return units.  We use thirty 
instead of ten price-to-book-sorted portfolios as test assets in columns fourteen to sixteen, because the finer 
sort increases the statistical power of our tests that account for the estimation uncertainty due to the first-
stage regressions.   
The cross-sectional regression R
2s of average discounted long-horizon returns on cash-flow betas 
stays over 50 percent for all horizons beyond one year.  At the five-year horizon, which roughly corresponds 
to the frequency of the business cycle, the regression R
2 is over 75 percent. 
Are these impressive R
2 obtained with implausible premia?  In Table II Panel A, the estimated 
intercepts of the regression range from 2.7 to 10.9 percent and slopes from 4.8 to 12.2 percent.  (The premia 
are statistically significant for horizons ranging from three to fifteen years.)  One way to judge whether the 
premium on cash-flow beta is reasonable is to recognize that  0 λ  should equal the (nominal) risk-free rate 
and  1 λ  the average discounted net return on the market portfolio less the risk-free rate.  The predicted   0 λ  
and  1 λ  are thus approximately 4 percent and 9.5 percent, which are close to unrestricted estimates of the 
premia.  If we restrict the premia to the values predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM (in sample means of 
the risk-free rate,  04 . 0 0 = λ , and market premium,  095 . 0 1 = λ ), the R
2s of the cross-sectional regressions 
remain high (from 25 to 55 percent for horizons ranging from two to fifteen years). 
III.  Evidence from a present-value model 
In this section, we use a formal present-value model to measure the relative importance of risk and 
mispricing to the cross-section of price-to-book ratios from a 1928-1999 panel of U.S. firms.  Our tests 
demonstrate that CAPM risk explains a substantial majority of the component of the dispersion in price-to-
book ratios related to predictable variation in returns, while the share of mispricing is small and statistically 
insignificant.  The market risk factor is especially successful when we measure good and bad states of the 
world based on the market portfolio’s cash flows.  Our results suggest that mispricing relative to the CAPM 
is not an important factor in determining a firm’s valuation multiple and consequently the level of a firm’s 
stock price.    
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Our test is based on a variant of the present-value formula.  We specify a stochastic-discount-factor 
present-value model that links firms’ current price-to-book ratios to expected future cash flows and to 
covariances of future cash flows with the stochastic discount factor.  If we restrict discount rates to be 
constant across firms, our decomposition allocates more than 25 percent of the cross-sectional price-to-book 
variance to mispricing.  However, if we allow the discount rates to vary as predicted by the CAPM, the 
variance share of mispricing is reduced to 20 percent in tests that use the market portfolio’s stock return as 
the risk factor and to –0.1 percent in tests that use the market portfolio’s cash flows as the factor.  The 
present-value model is a success in pricing value and growth stocks because it detects more market risk in 
value firms’ future cash flows than in growth firms’. 
A.  Stochastic-discount-factor present-value framework 
Our approach is based on the stochastic-discount-factor framework that enables us to easily study the 
pricing of risk and the impact of risk on the level of the stock prices.  Ultimately, this framework leads to a 
cross-sectional variance decomposition of price-to-book ratios.  We allocate the price-to-book variance to 
predictable variation in three components: (1) a risk-adjusted present value of N-period cash flows; (2) a 
risk-adjusted present value of the N-period-ahead terminal value (capturing the effects beyond the N-period 
horizon); and (3) a pricing-error component (as assigned by a particular economic model).   
A stochastic-discount-factor present-value model equates the stock price to the stochastically 
discounted value of the asset’s payoffs.  Consider buying a stock and selling it ex dividend a year from now.  
The stochastic-discount-factor formula equates the purchase price with the expectation of the product of the 
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where  P is the stock price, D dividends, and Q  the cumulative stochastic discount factor.  Subscripts k and 
t are indices to assets and time, respectively.  We denote the one-period stochastic discount factor by 
1 − t t Q Q  and normalize the initial value  0 Q  to one.  Our notation differs slightly from that in the previous 
literature: Cochrane (2001, p. 8) denotes the same one-period stochastic discount factor by  t m  and Duffie 
(1996, p.29) by  1 − t t π π . 
In general, if the law of one price holds, we can find at least one random variable  1 − t t Q Q  such that 
(7) holds in population (or in sample) if we make  1 − t t Q Q  a function of population (or sample) moments  
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and random asset payoffs.  However, it is important to note that if we specify  1 − t t Q Q  based on an 
economic model, (7) need not hold even in population if the chosen economic model is not true.  To capture 
the fact that an economic model and its implied stochastic discount factor are just models, we add a pricing-
error term to (7): 
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D P E P ε ε  (8) 
In (8),  1 − t t t Q Q ε  denotes the realized pricing error, and  ) ( 1 1 − − t t t t Q Q E ε  the (conditional) average pricing 
error, or simply pricing error.  Economic models of equilibrium prices, since they imply a stochastic discount 
factor  1 − t t Q Q , are “false” if any  ) ( 1 1 − − t t t t Q Q E ε  is nonzero. 
To measure the price-level impact of pricing errors, we iterate (8) forward  N  periods and use the law 
of iterated expectations to link the stock price to long-horizon sequences of stochastic discount factors and 
dividends: 
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P ME ε . (9) 
To relate the quantities in (9) to a firm, we equate  P to the market value of equity (ME) and D to 
dividends net of equity issues.  The implicit assumption here is that the investor follows a strategy of holding 
the entire equity-capital stock of the firm and participating in all equity issues and share repurchases. 
Suppose that the model (7) is true, and the pricing error in equation (8) is always zero.  Clearly, 
equation (9) is derived from (8), and therefore cannot provide any new restrictions that are not implied by 
(8).  However, the real advance in moving from (8) to (9) comes from better diagnosing the model’s failure 
if the model is not true, i.e., pricing errors are nonzero.  This is because equation (9) relates prices to long-
horizon sequences of stochastic discount factors and dividends, instead of to the one-period-ahead stochastic 
discount factor and future price (which itself is potentially affected by pricing errors).  Equation (9) provides 
a price-level mispricing metric,  ∑
−
= + + − −
1
0 , 1 1 ) ( ) / 1 (
N
j j t k j t t t Q E Q ε , a diagnostic that is perhaps more 
interpretable than the one-period pricing error of (2). 
Since we are interested in the cross-section of firms, working with a dividend-based model is 
inconvenient.  Therefore, we make an innocuous substitution: We use the clean-surplus relation 
t t t t D X BE BE − + = −1 , where BE  is book equity and  X  clean-surplus earnings, to transform the 
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(Feltham and Ohlson (1999) and Ang and Liu (2001) derive similar risk-adjusted abnormal-earnings models 
and investigate the models’ properties in more detail.)  Since we do not iterate (10) to infinity and since we 
define earnings such that it satisfies the clean-surplus relation by construction, the substitution of earnings 
and book values is truly innocuous and does not transform our paper from a finance paper to an accounting 
paper as a byproduct. 
We define the quantity in brackets in first line of equation (10) as “abnormal earnings,”  A: 
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Equation (11) defines abnormal earnings as (clean-surplus) accounting earnings less a state-dependent 
charge for the amount of book equity employed in producing those earnings.  Intuitively, the addition of risk 
to the basic abnormal-earnings formula of Edwards and Bell (1961) and Ohlson (1995) recognizes the fact 
that the cost of capital varies across states of the economy. 
Our empirical tests require stationary variables; however, stock prices are clearly nonstationary.  To 
achieve stationarity, price needs to be normalized by some variable that is cointegrated with price.  Dividing 
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For finite N, the terms of (12) can plausibly be assumed to be stationary.  In addition to the above-mentioned 
desirable statistical property, the terms of the normalized equation (12) also have economically intuitive 
interpretations.  The first term of (12) is a unit constant, defining the base case of market equity trading at the 
value of book equity.  The second term discounts the firms' future abnormal earnings over the explicit  
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forecasting period of N years, adjusting for risk: A firm’s stock deserves to trade above its book value, if the 
firm’s profitability exceeds the risk-adjusted cost of capital.
4  The third term is a terminal-value term, which 
takes the value zero if the market value and book value are expected to fully converge within the explicit 
forecasting period.  If full convergence is not achieved, the terminal value captures the effect of all future 
abnormal earnings and pricing errors.  Finally, the fourth term captures the contribution of N-period 
cumulative pricing error to a firm’s price-to-book ratio. 
Equation (12) serves as the basis of our cross-sectional variance decomposition.  Following Cochrane 
(1991,1992), we multiply both sides of (6) by  ) / ( 1 , 1 , BE ME E BE ME t k t k − − − , where  ) / ( BE ME E  denotes 
the average price-to-book ratio (over time and stocks), so that  ) / ( 1 , 1 , BE ME E BE ME t k t k − − −  is simply the 





















































































































































Price-to-book ratios can vary more if price-to-book covaries strongly with future risk-adjusted abnormal 
earnings and/or pricing errors, or if the convergence of price and book value is slow. 
Dividing both sides by the variance of price-to-book ratios gives the relative variance decomposition 
in terms of three predictive regression coefficients: 
                                                           
 
4 Because E(xy) = E(x)E(y) + cov(x,y), abnormal earnings are more valuable if they covary positively with the 
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The three regression coefficients in equation (14) can be interpreted as a percentage variance decomposition 
of firms’ price-to-book ratios.  The price-to-book ratio must predict at least some of the following three 
components: Risk-adjusted present value of cumulative N-period abnormal earnings and/or the risk-adjusted 
terminal value and/or the risk-adjusted present-value of cumulative N-period pricing errors.  We account for 
100 percent of the variance: Since the three components sum up to the t-1 price-to-book ratio, the regression 
coefficients also sum up to one. 
To make the variance decomposition (14) operational, we also need a model of priced risk, a 
stochastic discount factor.  We estimate the variance decomposition with three simple candidate discount 
factors.  The first discount factor is simply a constant δ , which we use as the benchmark case.  Because we 
specify the stochastic discount factors and their parameters in real terms, but our asset data are nominal, we 
also multiply our real discount factors by the ratio of price levels,  t t π π 1 − .  The nominal “constant” 
discount factor is thus a random variable  t t π δπ / 1 − . 
The second discount factor is a linear function of the excess return on a value-weight portfolio of all 
stocks (RMRF): 
  t t t t t RMRF Q Q π π γ γ 1 1 0 1 ) ( / − − × + =  (15) 
We dub this discount-factor model the “stock-return CAPM.”  The logic behind the second discount factor is 
the hope that priced risk is captured by a single factor prescribed by the Sharpe-Lintner-Black CAPM, in 
which the stochastic discount factor is a linear function of the return on the portfolio of aggregate wealth (the 
market portfolio).  Although the CAPM is a very simple model and thus probably a naïve description of 
reality, it has two important advantages over its competitors: First, it has only two parameters, increasing the  
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statistical power that is at a premium in our long-horizon regressions (14).  Second, because the CAPM was 
proposed before the relation between price-to-book ratios and average returns was discovered in the 
academic literature, the CAPM is largely immune to the problem termed “model-mining” bias by Fama 
(1991). 
Our third discount factor model is also motivated by the CAPM, but gets closer to the spirit of robust 
measurement of risks if stock-return covariances are potential contaminated with mispricing.  Our third risk 
factor is a linear function of the market portfolio’s log ROE: 
  t t
real
t M t t ROE g g Q Q π π 1 , 1 0 1 )] 1 log( [ / − − × + + = , (16) 
where 
real
t M ROE ,  is the aggregate real clean-surplus earnings of all stocks divided by the aggregate beginning-
of-the-period real book equity.  If  1 g  is negative as most asset-pricing theories would predict, the discount 
factor penalizes stocks whose profitability covaries with market-wide profitability.  We dub this discount 
factor the “cash-flow CAPM.”   
B.  Estimation strategy and empirical results 
Our estimation procedure has two integrated steps. The regressions (14) assume that the stochastic-
discount-factor realizations are known and can be used to construct the dependent variables of the 
regressions.  Thus, the first necessary step is to pick the parameter values for the stochastic discount factor to 
be used in computation of the stochastic-discount-factor realizations.  The second step estimates the relative 
variance decomposition (14) by running the three regressions.  We implement both stages simultaneously 
using Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM) so that the standard errors of the second-step 
regressions take into account the estimation uncertainty due to the first stage. 
  The stochastic-discount-factor parameters contained in vector b (δ  in the case of the constant 
discount rate model and  0 γ ,  1 γ ,  0 g , and  1 g  in the case of the CAPM) are estimated by matching the 
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We omit the first moment condition when estimating the constant-discount-factor model, because it would 
be unrealistic to ask the same constant discount factor to fit the average returns on stocks and Treasury bills.  
The first and second moment conditions help in picking the stochastic-discount-factor parameters by asking 
the model to price the one-period (nominally) risk-free return and one-period excess return on the market 
portfolio, respectively.  The remaining moment conditions in (17) are restrictions on average price-to-book 
ratios relative to the present value of subsequent abnormal earnings and terminal values of the test assets, 
derived from (12) by assuming that the stochastic-discount-factor model is true and the average pricing 
errors are zero. 
We use two stages in our GMM procedure.  In the first stage, we use an identity matrix as the 
weighting matrix.  This weighting matrix is likely to produce sensible but imprecise first-stage parameter 
estimates.  We then collect the moment errors  t u  and compute a Newey-West (1987) estimate of the long-
run moment-error covariance matrix,  NW S ˆ .  We set the number of lags and leads in the Newey-West 




































   (18) 
as the GMM weighting matrix, where max  is the number of moment conditions in the system. Our 
weighting matrix  2 W  recognizes the heteroskedasticity of the moment errors and places more weight on 
low-variance moments, but does not adjust the weighting to accommodate the (often spurious) correlation 
structure of the moment errors. 
Although using 
1 ˆ −
NW S  as the second-stage weighting matrix leads to an asymptotically efficient 
estimator (given the chosen moments), the finite-sample performance of this weighting matrix is often poor.  
Since our moment-error matrix has a low time dimension, a high cross-sectional dimension, and significant 
autocorrelation, using the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix 
1 ˆ −
NW S  would be a recipe for disaster, 
especially for long forecast horizons.  The peril in using 
1 ˆ −
NW S  in small samples stems from the matrix 
inverse being a highly nonlinear function of the estimated correlations.  Small estimation errors in the off-
diagonal elements of  NW S ˆ  may unexpectedly result in enormous errors in 
1 ˆ −
NW S .  For a detailed discussion 
on the selection of a robust weighting matrix in asset-pricing applications, see Cochrane (2001, p.210-219).   
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Because we use  2 W  instead of 
1 ˆ −
NW S  as the weighting matrix, we compute the sampling covariance matrix of 
the estimated parameters using the formulas modified by Cochrane (2001, p. 212) for the case of a 
prespecified weighting matrix. 
Each year we create ten value-weight portfolios of stocks by sorting on price-to-book and track the 
subsequent dividends, book values, and market values of these portfolios for fifteen years subsequent to the 
portfolio formation (or until the end of the sample, whichever comes first.)  All data for these portfolios are 
annual and in nominal terms.  We use this 10-by-15-by-60 data panel as our sample.  Our factor data, RMRF, 
are the same as used by Davis, Fama, and French (2000). 
We compute the clean-surplus earnings on the stocks in these portfolios using a formula 
net
t t t t D BE BE X + − = −1 , where 
net D  is net dividends, i.e., gross dividends 
gross D  (from CRSP) less equity 
offerings plus share repurchase.  We use an implied figure for year t equity offerings less share repurchases: 
  1 (1 )
gross
tt t t ME R ME D − =+ +  (19) 
The adjustment is not essential, however: Using gross instead of net dividends in the clean-surplus formula 
will yield very similar results.  
Table III shows the parameter estimates for the constant-discount-rate model and the two versions of 
the CAPM.  As listed in column one, each row in Table III corresponds to a specific horizon N of equation 
(17); for example, row three picks the parameters to match the average price-to-book ratio with the value of 
three-year cumulative abnormal earnings plus the terminal value after the three-year horizon.   
The second column of Table III shows the parameter estimates of the constant-discount-rate model.  
The estimated real constant discount rate, δˆ, lies between 0.91 and 0.93, depending on the estimation 
horizon.  The third and fourth columns of Table III report the parameter estimates of the stock-return CAPM 
stochastic discount factor.  The intercept,  0 ˆ γ , ranges from 1.02 to 1.08 and the slope,  1 ˆ γ , from -0.90 to -
1.42, depending on the horizon.  The negative coefficient on RMRF is consistent with the theory: An asset is 
risky if it covaries negatively with the stochastic discount factor.   
The fifth and sixth columns show the implications of the estimated stock-return CAPM parameters for 
the risk-free rate and the market premium, which may be more interesting than the parameter estimates per 
se.  To evaluate whether particular parameter values of the CAPM-based stochastic discount factor are 
reasonable, we solve for the implied average risk-free rate and market premium.  The average one-period 
risk-free (in real terms) bond price is simply the expectation of the real stochastic discount factor,  
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) ( 1 0 RMRF E γ γ + .  The real risk-free rate that corresponds to this average price,  1 )] ( /[ 1 1 0 − + RMRF E γ γ , 
can be compared to historical bond-market data to judge its plausibility.  Given the second moment of the 
excess market return, our parameters also imply the average market premium: 
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 (20) 
We add two moment conditions to the system that measure the average excess return and average squared 














Adding these moment conditions allows us to compute the point estimates and standard errors of the average 
risk-free rate and market premium implied by the stock-return CAPM stochastic discount factor.   
The estimated average real risk-free one-period bond prices range from 0.94 to 0.95; these bond prices 
correspond to (net) real risk-free rates from 6 to 5 percent.  Although these estimates are higher than the 
realized real returns on one-year T-bills over our sample period, Siegel (1999) argues that values within this 
range may be reasonable estimates of the ex-ante expected real risk-free rate.  The market-premium 
estimates are also reasonable, ranging from 7 to 10 percent.  Although these estimates are high compared to 
the predictions of most economic models as well as compared to the dividend-yield-based estimates of Fama 
and French (2002), they are close to the sample means.   
The cash-flow CAPM’s estimated parameters are shown in columns seven and eight of Table III.  
Consistent with the theory, the slopes on the market’s ROE are negative and statistically significant. 
Our tests assume that the market premium does not covary systematically with betas, ruling out the 
conditional CAPM.  Instead of testing a conditional CAPM specification, we measure the price-level impact 
of the static CAPM’s pricing errors.  The approach of this paper is thus distinct from those of Jagannathan 
and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and Santos and Veronesi (2001) who argue that conditional 
versions of the CAPM help explain the cross-section of one-period expected returns (instead of prices or 
price-to-book ratios). Our results, of course, do not contradict those of the above authors. 
The cross-sectional variance decomposition (14) is simultaneously estimated from another set of 
independent moment conditions.  Since these additional regression moment conditions are exactly identified  
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as a separate group, adding them to the system does not alter the point estimates of stochastic-discount-factor 
parameters identified from the other moment conditions. 
We mold (14) to our exact regression specification as follows.  First, we include time dummies in the 
pooled regressions, effectively running the regressions with cross-sectionally demeaned data.  This allows us 
to focus on the cross-sectional variation in firms’ price-to-book ratios.  Second, we deflate both the 
dependent and explanatory variables with the particular portfolio’s average price-to-book ratio.  This 
weighting practice can be seen as a simplified version of generalized least squares (GLS).  The regression 
residuals of (14) are much more variable for high-price-to-book portfolios than for low-price-to-book 
portfolios in our data, which is a natural consequence of high-price-to-book portfolios’ data being divided by 
very low book-equity numbers.  By placing less emphasis on data points with more variable errors, our 
weighting scheme acts much like GLS.   
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where  WLS β′  is the variance share of risk-adjusted abnormal earnings,  WLS β ′ ′  is the variance share of the 















are the time-series averages of each portfolios price-to-book ratios.  DT  is a matrix of time dummies 
(subsuming the regression constant), and  WLS WLS WLS ∆ ′ ′ ′ ∆′ ′ ∆′ and , ,  are dummy coefficients which we 
subsequently ignore.  The stochastic-discount-factor realizations in the above formulas are computed using 
the parameter estimates of Table III.   
Table IV shows the results from the WLS regressions with time dummies (equation (22)).  As in 
Table III, each row of Table IV corresponds to the horizon indicated in the first column.  Columns 2-4 of the  
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table show the price-to-book variance decomposition for the constant-discount-factor model.  Moving down 
column two of the tables, the variance share of cash flows increases from 6.6 percent at the one-year horizon 
to 37.7 percent at the fifteen-year horizon.  The mispricing component of the constant-discount-factor model 
also grows as the regressions’ horizon lengthens.  Moving down column four of Table IV, the variance share 
of mispricing increases from 3.2 at the one-year horizon to 26.9 percent at the fifteen-year horizon.   
Summarizing the results, the constant-discount-rate model allocates about 40 percent of the cross-sectional 
price-to-book variance to variation in present value of future fifteen-year cash flows, about 35 percent to 
variation in fifteen-year terminal values, and about 25 percent to mispricing. 
Columns 5-7 of Table IV show the price-to-book variance decomposition for the stock-return CAPM.  
Column 5 shows that the variance share of cash flows increases from 6.7 percent at the one-year horizon to 
42.3 at the fifteen-year horizon.  The variance shares for the cash-flow CAPM are in columns 8-10.  The 
variance share of cash flows in column eight increases from 5.0 percent at the one-year horizon to 52.0 
percent at the fifteen-year horizon. 
Remarkably, the variance share of the risk-adjusted present value of cash flows is much higher for 
both the stock-return and cash-flow CAPM specifications than for the constant-discount-rate model.  In 
words, the CAPM values the long-run cash flows of growth stocks at a higher multiple than value stocks’, 
because value stocks’ long-run ability to generate cash flows covaries more strongly with the stock return 
and ROE on the market portfolio than growth stocks’.  
The mispricing share of stock-return CAPM is shown in column 7 of Table IV.  Consistent with the 
previous research by Fama and French (1992, 1993, and 1996) and Davis, Fama, and French (2000), at the 
one-year horizon the stock-return CAPM cannot price portfolios sorted on price-to-book ratios.  At the 
fifteen-year horizon, however, the stock-return CAPM allocates 20.1 percent of the variance to mispricing, 
which is less than for the constant discount rate model.   
The punch line (or column) of our paper is column ten of Table IV.  The cash-flow CAPM is our most 
successful specification.  At the fifteen-year horizon, the cash-flow CAPM allocates only -0.1 percent of the 
price-to-book variance to mispricing.  We interpret this variance share as economically and statistically 
insignificant.  Remarkably, introducing the market portfolio’s cash flow as a risk factor will move the 
component considered mispricing by the constant-discount-rate model to the risk-adjusted present value of 
cash flows, not to terminal value.  We find it comforting that our results identify systematic risk in the cash  
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flows of value stocks rather than in the fifteen-year terminal value as the former are unambiguously 
interpretable as covariance due to cash flows, not mispricing.
5  
Our results that cash-flow betas explain price levels is related results by Bansal, Dittmar, and 
Lundblad (2002).  In contemporaneous research, Bansal et al. measure risks from dividend growth rates and 
find that a version of the consumption-based asset pricing model performs well in explaining average returns 
to a number of dynamic trading strategies.  While their paper and ours share the idea of measuring risks from 
cash flows, our paper focuses on buy-and-hold strategies with constant portfolio definitions and our results 
are thus easier to relate to the level of the stock price. 
 Figure 1 graphs the variance shares from Table IV’s stock-return CAPM specification as a function 
of the horizon.  The lightly colored area in the bottom represents the variance share of risk-adjusted cash 
flows, the white area in the middle the share of terminal value, and the dark area in the top the share of 
pricing error; all relative to the stock-return CAPM.  For comparison purposes, the variance shares from the 
constant-discount-rate model are plotted with bold dashed lines.  After the first year, the variance share of 
stock-return CAPM mispricing is always less than that of the constant-discount-rate model.  Consistent with 
the above-cited results in the previous literature, there is a visible pricing-error component at the one-year 
horizon.  This is what one would expect knowing that immediately after the sort value stocks’ returns 
actually have lower CAPM betas than growth stocks’ returns.  However, increasing the horizon beyond one 
year does not increase the variance share of mispricing as much as for the constant-discount-rate model. 
Figure 2 plots a similar variance-share graph for the cash-flow CAPM.  For most horizons, the pricing 
error is negatively related to the price-to-book ratios, that is, value stocks appear slightly overpriced relative 
to growth stocks.  At the fifteen-year horizon, the mispricing share ends at almost exactly zero.   
Approximately fifteen percentage points of the improvement over the constant-discount-rate model at the 
                                                           
 
5 Our cross-sectional result that the CAPM works well for the level of prices may be related to Daniel and 
Marshall’s (1997).  They document that the consumption-based habit model of Constantinides (1990) is able to match 
the mean and the variance of the observed equity premium, capture time variation in the equity premium, and can better 
match the observed risk-free rate when using long-horizon return and consumption data.  
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fifteen-year horizon comes from the cash-flow component.  Although value stocks continue to earn higher 
returns than growth stocks for the entire fifteen-year horizon, the cash-flow CAPM justifies these expected 
returns first by the riskiness of the terminal value in the shorter-horizon regressions and later by the riskiness 
of cash flows in the longer-horizon regressions. 
Our variance-decomposition results suggest that the CAPM provides a high-R
2 explanation of the 
levels of stock prices for value and growth stocks.  Although the abnormal returns on a strategy of sorting 
stocks into price-to-book deciles, buying value stocks and shorting growth stocks, and turning the portfolio 
over every year cannot be explained by the stock-return CAPM, the cash-flow version of the model gets the 
levels of stock prices almost exactly “right.” 
IV.  Evidence from portfolio returns 
In this section, we present more traditional evidence from portfolio returns and confirm our results 
using simple portfolio trading rules, monthly returns, and bootstrapped confidence levels.  The portfolio-
return evidence complements the above cash-flow-based results for the following reasons.  First, the cash 
flows are measured annually, while our portfolio-return tests use monthly stock returns.  Second, statistical 
inference in the previous tests relies on asymptotic Newey-West (1987) standard errors, while our return 
tests use more reliable bootstrap methods.  Third, the portfolio-return tests allow us to establish a direct link 
to the previous literature on the performance of value-minus-growth strategies.  
We first sort stocks into price-to-book deciles.  Every year, we run fifteen different sorts: Deciles 
sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, deciles sorted on year-t-2 price-to-book ratios,…, and deciles sorted 
on year-t-15 price-to-book ratios.  As a result, we have 715 months of returns on 150 portfolios for the 
period 6/1941-12/2000 (the maximum period for which our data made it possible to compute returns for the 
portfolios formed by sorting on the year-t-15 price-to-book ratios). 
We compute our measure of risk by regressing the monthly returns on the resulting 150 portfolios 
(fifteen different horizons by ten price-to-book categories) on the contemporaneous and lagged market 
returns.  We then sum up the regression coefficients into what we call “total beta,” in contrast to 
“contemporaneous beta,” i.e., beta estimated without the lagged market returns in the regression.  The logic 
underlying the inclusion of lagged returns is the following.  We argue that the betas measured based on only 
contemporaneous monthly returns may be misleading for a number of reasons.  If some price-to-book deciles  
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systematically contain illiquid securities, the measured monthly returns may be asynchronous, and some 
portfolios’ returns disproportionately so.  In addition, relatively short-horizon effects such as tax-loss 
harvesting by individual investors, window dressing by institutional investors, and/or delayed reaction to 
information for stocks that are not extensively covered by analysts may garble the relevant long-run relations 
in contemporaneous monthly returns.  The impact of asynchronous price reaction on beta estimates has been 
studied by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) who propose simple techniques to measure 
market betas by utilizing summed betas from regressions of returns on both contemporaneous and lagged 
market returns.  We follow their suggestion when measuring betas, and include up to eleven lags in our 
regressions.
6   
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the CAPM beta of a value-minus-growth portfolio as a function of 
years from the sort.  The dependent variables in the regressions are an equal-weight portfolio of the three 
value-weight lowest-price-to-book deciles (marked with a solid line and triangles) and an equal-weight 
portfolio of the three value-weight highest-price-to-book deciles (marked with just a solid line).  The upper-
left plot is produced with no lagged market returns in the regressions, the upper-right with one lag, the 
lower-left with five lags, and the lower-right with eleven lags.   
Figure 3 clearly illustrates how the long-horizon risks of value and growth stocks are very different 
from the risks at short horizons.  Focusing on the contemporaneous betas in the upper-left plot, growth 
stocks have much higher contemporaneous betas than value stocks immediately after the sort.  However, as 
time passes from the sort, the risk of value stocks increases while the risk of growth stocks decreases.  
Between the years five and ten, contemporaneous betas cross and value stocks reach their permanently high 
and growth stocks their permanently low contemporaneous betas.  The time pattern in total betas is very 
similar, but the total betas of growth stocks are much lower than their contemporaneous betas at all horizons, 
and the crossing takes place much earlier.  Across specifications, value stocks have statistically significantly 
                                                           
 
6 Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) as well as Handa, Kothari, and Wasley (1993) show that the CAPM 
performs better when betas are measured using annual instead of monthly returns.  Their focus is in explaining short-
horizon expected returns, differentiating our tests from theirs.  
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higher betas than growth stocks fifteen years after the sort: t-statistics of the difference in total betas are 4.9, 
5.0, 4.6, and 2.8 for regressions with zero, one, five and eleven lags, respectively.  Thus, we conclude that 
the long-run permanent level of CAPM beta is significantly higher for value stocks than for growth stocks, a 
difference as large as 0.2 for these portfolios (and larger for the extreme deciles one and ten). 
To verify that the surprising crossing pattern in Figure 3 is not an artifact of the time trend in value 
and growth stocks’ betas, in Table V we estimate a parametric specification for the betas: 
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Above, TREND is a linear time trend in centuries (month index divided by 1200), normalized to zero in the 
middle of the sample.  YEARS is the number of years from the sort divided by one hundred; or more 
informatively the number of lags we used in firms’ price-to-book ratios when sorting the portfolios into 
deciles, divided by one hundred.  Table V reports the sums of coefficients (i.e., total betas) for the value, 
growth and difference portfolios as a function of L (the number of monthly lags).  The results suggest that 
even after controlling for the time trend, growth stocks’ betas decline and value stocks’ betas increase after 
the sort.  Based on the coefficient of the interaction term, these patterns appear to be especially strong in the 
later years of the sample. 
The above results show that value stocks do have higher long-run betas than growth stocks.  The task 
remains to show that the magnitude of this difference in long-run betas is large enough to justify the 
magnitude of the long-run stock returns, which we take up below.  
We examine N-year holding-period strategies based on return series computed from the 150 portfolios 
used in the beta tests.  We define the N-year decile M as a portfolio strategy that invests equally in N 
portfolios: Decile M sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, decile M sorted on year-t-2 price-to-book 
ratios,…, and decile M sorted on year-t-N price-to-book ratios.  For example, a two-year holding-period 
strategy for the highest price-to-book portfolio (two-year decile ten) invests half in stocks that are the highest 
price-to-book stocks in the beginning of the return period and half in stocks that were the highest price-to-
book stocks a year ago.  We extend these “holding periods” out to fifteen years.  As a consequence, the 
fifteen-year decile portfolios approximate a buy-and-hold investor’s experience and allow us to examine  
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long-horizon effects at a higher frequency and with more reliable statistical tools than in the price-level 
variance-decomposition tests. 
For all of the statistics we report in Table VI, we also report standard errors (reported inside 
parentheses) as well as p-values (estimated using a bootstrap technique and reported inside braces).  The 
bootstrap procedure proceeds as follows.  First, we repeat the regression of the 150 portfolios on the market 
return and eleven lags setting the coefficient on the constant to zero.  We preserve the 12-by-1 beta vector 
and the 715-by-150 error matrix.  We demean the error matrix using the time-series mean of each column of 
errors, since under the null the mean error from the regression is zero.  We then begin 10,000 bootstrap 
iterations.  At each iteration we produce a random design matrix by sampling 715 rows from the original 
715-by-12 design matrix of market returns.  We separately randomly sample 715 rows from the demeaned 
error matrix.  All sampling is done with replacement.  We produce a new dependent-variable matrix using 
the newly selected design and error matrices in conjunction with the beta estimate (Y = X×beta + errors).  
Finally, we regress the new dependent-variable matrix on the new design matrix to get a draw of the 
intercept vector and corresponding GRS statistic (Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989)) and other statistics 
under the null.  Then, we compute the percentiles of our point estimates in our sample of 10,000 bootstrap 
iterations. 
The second column of Table VI reports the GRS statistic of CAPM tests of the ten portfolios at 
different horizons, along with the asymptotic and bootstrap probability values.  For the sake of brevity, we 
only report results for one, two, three, five, ten, and 15-year deciles.  The first row reports the well-known 
result that the CAPM cannot price returns over the next year on portfolios formed by sorting on the most 
recent price-to-book ratio.  The GRS statistic is 1.9182, which rejects the null hypothesis that the one-year 
deciles’ intercepts are jointly zero at about five-percent level of significance.  This pattern holds true and 
strengthens over holding periods up to five years.  However, for ten-year and fifteen-year holding period 
returns (ten-year and fifteen-year deciles), we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the CAPM can price 
the returns on the price-to-book deciles.  Moreover, the CAPM alphas are no longer positively correlated 
with the price-to-book ratios. 
The significance of the holding period for alphas is further illustrated in Figure 4.  The top panel of 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of mean excess returns.  The price-to-book pattern in mean returns is strong  
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even at the fifteen-year holding period.  In the alphas displayed in the bottom panel, however, the pattern has 
disappeared almost completely.   
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation demonstrates the economic importance of CAPM risk 
adjustment.  Concentrating on deciles one and ten at the fifteen year horizon (not reported in Table VI) , the 
price level impact of the difference in expected returns is approximately 44 percent (ignoring compounding 
and using the formula 12×15×(0.99%-0.75%).)  Not adjusting for risk (or assuming that the risk is equal) 
would lead to a conclusion that the highest-price-to-book decile is overpriced by almost by a factor of two 
relative to the lowest-price-to-book decile.  However, adjusting returns with their total CAPM betas leads to 
a very different conclusion: The price level impact of the difference in alphas is a statistically insignificant 
14 percent (12×15×(0.0820%-0.0018%)).)  The economic significance of the difference between 14 and 44 
percent mispricing is enormous. 
The next two columns analyze similar value-minus-growth long-short portfolios in more detail.  We 
report the mean return and alpha of a strategy that goes long the top three value-weight portfolios (low price-
to-book) and shorts the bottom three value-weights portfolios (high price-to-book) with equal weights.  Thus 
at the one-year horizon, the strategy is quite similar to Fama and French’s (1993) HML, except that there is 
no size stratification.  As Fama and French show, in the year following portfolio formation, all of the average 
return can be attributed to mispricing vis-à-vis the CAPM.  This fact is true even for the strategy that buys 
value and sells growth and holds the positions for three years.  For the three-year holding portfolio, the mean 
and CAPM alpha are both 0.0037, measured in fractions per month.  In a statistical test not reported in the 
table, we cannot reject the null that the ratio of alpha to mean is 1.0 at the five-percent level of significance. 
However, as the holding period grows beyond three years, the CAPM explains more and more of the 
average return differential.  At the ten-year horizon, the long-short portfolio generates an average return of 
0.0025.  Approximately one-third of this return is justified by the CAPM, as the alpha is only 17 basis points 
per month.  For the fifteen-year holding period strategy, the alpha is only eight basis points, though the mean 
return is still an economically important 18 basis points and marginally statistically significantly different 
from zero.  We argue that the risk of the fifteen-year holding period strategy approximates the risk relevant 
for price levels.  In a statistical test not reported, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the ratio of alpha 
to mean is zero at the five-percent level of significance.  This result confirms the findings of the previous 
sections.    
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Recall that, for a given horizon, we have ten price-to-book-sorted portfolio returns each month.  The 
remaining columns in Table VI report results from a regression of the average return on the ten portfolios on 
the total beta of these portfolios.  Column five reports the intercept ( 0 λ ) from this regression; column six 
reports the coefficient on total beta ( 1 λ ), and column seven has the (unadjusted) R
2. 
As in Fama and MacBeth (1973), under the null that the CAPM is true, the intercept from a regression 
of mean excess returns on betas is an estimate of the excess return on the riskless (zero-beta) portfolio.  The 
regression slope is an estimate of the market premium (premium for an additional unit of beta).  Column five 
shows that the results for short holding periods are inconsistent with the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.  The zero-
beta premium estimated is negative; for the two- and three-year holding-period portfolios we can reject the 
hypothesis that the CAPM is true and the zero-beta premium is zero.  For the fifteen-year holding period, in 
contrast, the point estimate is about zero, consistent with the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. 
Column six shows estimates of the market premium.  For short holding periods, the slope has a wrong 
sign and/or small magnitude.  For intermediate holding periods (3-10 years) the estimated  1 λ  is far higher 
than the historical market premium, often over 20 percent per annum.  The hypothesis that the estimate 
equals the market premium is strongly rejected for holding periods from three to ten years (p-value in 
column six).  This is because the value portfolios substantially outperform the growth portfolios, but there is 
only small difference in the portfolio betas, so a large beta premium is necessary to explain differences in 
average returns.  The fifteen-year horizon portfolios, on the other hand, imply a market premium estimate of 
79 basis points, quite similar to the historical market premium.  We are unable to reject the null that the 
alphas are zero and therefore the hypothesis that the beta premium is equal to the historical average excess 
return on the market.  
Column seven of Table VI shows the R
2 from the regression of means on betas.  For short holding 
periods, betas explain virtually none of the difference in mean excess returns.  For the longest-horizon 
portfolio, however, the R
2 is 70.31 percent; we manifestly fail to reject the null that the R
2 is equal to 100 
percent, with a bootstrap p-value of 0.4474. 
V.  Risk-sorted portfolios 
We also sort firms into portfolios on firm size and stock-return beta.  The firm-size sort is analogous 
to the market-to-book sort, except the sort variable is the market value of equity.  When we sort on the  
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estimated stock-return beta, we first construct the sort variable by running firm-by-firm OLS regressions of 
firms’ monthly stock return on the CRSP value-weight index return.  We use up to five years of data and 
require at least 36 valid monthly observations for each firm. 
The logic behind including beta-sorted and size-sorted portfolios as test assets is the following. The 
evidence presented in the main body of the paper shows that there is a monotonically decreasing relationship 
between price-to-book ratios and cash-flow betas and long-run stock-return betas.  Previous research shows 
that the relationship between price-to-book ratios and average returns is also monotonically decreasing.  
Thus, given this evidence, it is not surprising that the cash-flow betas explain average returns well.   
To subject the model to a tougher test, we adapt the idea of Daniel and Titman (1996) and include 
beta-sorted and size-sorted portfolios in the test-asset sets.  Portfolios sorted on stock-return beta and firm 
size show variation in cash-flow betas which is independent from their price-to-book ratios.  If the risk 
loading (instead of the book-to-market characteristic) determines the average return, the inclusion of these 
risk-sorted portfolios should not significantly decrease the premium on cash-flow beta. 
While there exists an extensive literature on estimating and forecasting firms’ stock-return betas, the 
prediction of cash-flow betas is mostly an uncharted territory.  Sorts on firms’ or industries’ past five-year 
cash-flow betas do not induce any pattern in post-formation cash-flow betas.  When we sort stocks on size, 
the difference between the top three and bottom three deciles’ cash-flow betas is statistically significant at 
the five-percent level for horizons from two to fifteen years. When we sort stocks on estimated stock-return 
betas, the difference between the top three and bottom three deciles’ cash-flow betas is marginally 
statistically significant for the one-year horizon (t-statistic 1.85) but insignificant for horizons from two to 
fifteen years.   
Of course, because the second-stage regression uses estimated betas, it is subject to the errors-in-
variables bias.  The magnitude of the errors-in-variables bias depends on both the variance of the beta-
estimation error and the cross-sectional variance of true betas across portfolios.  The lower the estimation-
error variance and higher the cross-sectional variance of true betas (i.e., higher the signal-to-noise ratio), the 
lower the downward bias in the slope coefficient and R
2 of the second-stage regression. Because the price-to-
book-sorted portfolios exhibit more spread in estimated cash-flow betas than the risk-sorted portfolios, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that including the risk-sorted portfolios as test assets will lower the cross-sectional 
variance of the true betas and thus lower the signal-to-noise ratio.  Therefore, even if the pricing model has a  
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true R
2 of 100 percent when explaining population means, we would expect the estimated second-stage slope 
and R
2 to decline slightly as we add the risk-sorted portfolios to the set of test assets. 
Table VII measures whether the cash-flow betas can simultaneously explain the prices of value and 
growth stocks and portfolios sorted on risk proxies.  The dependent variable in the pricing regressions is the 
average N-period discounted stock return and the independent variable the estimated cash-flow beta, as in 
Table II.  We use two test-asset sets: First, thirty price-to-book-sorted portfolios and thirty portfolios sorted 
on OLS-stock-return betas and, second, thirty price-to-book-sorted and thirty size-sorted portfolios.   
Columns two to seven of Table VII show premia and R
2 estimated from these alternative asset sets.  Adding 
the stock-return-beta-sorted portfolios to the test assets lowers the beta premium estimate, but only slightly.  
For example, at the five-year horizon, price-to-book-sorted portfolios indicate a beta premium of 8.6 percent 
(Table II), and adding beta-sorted portfolios lowers the estimate to 6.9 percent (Table VII).
7  Replacing the 
beta-sorted portfolios with size-sorted portfolios yields a closer beta-premium estimate of 7.5 percent.   
Additionally, the high R
2s in Table II are robust to addition of risk-sorted portfolios: R
2s of the cross-
sectional regressions remain high (from 23 to 63 percent for horizons from two to fifteen years).  Taking into 
account the increased attenuation bias due to lower signal-to-noise ratio, we thus conclude that our finding 
that cash-flow betas explain the level of stock prices well is robust to including risk-sorted portfolios as test 
assets. 
We also checked the robustness of the variance-decomposition results to the inclusion of risk-sorted 
portfolios as test assets.  Table VIII shows the variance decompositions estimated from two asset sets: Ten 
portfolios sorted on stock-return betas and ten portfolios sorted on price-to-book ratios (Panel A) and ten 
portfolios sorted on size and ten portfolios sorted on price-to-book ratios (Panel B).  Consistent with the 
results obtained from price-to-book-sorted portfolios alone, the pricing-error component is largest for the 
                                                           
 
7 When estimating the cash-flow betas of beta-sorted and ME/BE-sorted portfolios, we use the maximum 
number of data points available for each portfolio return series (1933-1999 for beta-sorted and 1928-1999 for price-to-
book sorted portoflios).  When computing the moment-error covariance matrix used in the GMM standard-error 
formulas, we only use the period for which the return data are available for all portfolios.   
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constant-discount-rate model and smallest for the cash-flow CAPM.  Furthermore, the cash-flow CAPM’s 
pricing-error variance fraction is statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
Finally, we also repeated the tests on monthly stock returns with the alternative test-asset sets and 
report the results in Table IX.  As evident from the table, these tests essentially break the stock-return-based 
model.  Adding beta-sorted portfolios has a particularly devastating effect on the beta premium and cross-
sectional R
2 in the first four columns of Table IX: The fifteen-year-horizon beta premium (0.79 percent per 
month) obtained in Table VI drops to one sixth its previous value in column four of Table IX (0.12 percent 
month).  To summarize our results, by including risk-sorted portfolios in the analysis we are unable to break 
models that link cash-flow betas to price levels but are “successful” in breaking models that use stock-return 
betas. 
VI.  Conclusions 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of risk and mispricing to the cross-
sectional variation in firms’ stock prices.  Our approach differs from the previous cross-sectional research in 
two important ways.  
First, unlike most previous cross-sectional studies, we follow Summers (1986) and concentrate on the 
level of the price instead of trading profits.  We argue that focusing on the level of the price has important 
advantages.  A common definition of market efficiency states that stock prices reflect information to the 
point that the marginal benefits of acquiring information and trading on it do not exceed the marginal costs 
(Jensen (1978)).  One problem in testing market efficiency is that what constitutes a reasonable level of 
information and transaction costs is ambiguous.  The interpretation of before-cost trading profits on high-
turnover investment strategies can crucially depend on the assumed level of costs.  On the contrary, the 
price-level criterion advocated by us is largely immune to this concern.  Evaluating market efficiency at the 
price level is analogous to evaluating trading profits on a simple strategy of buying or short-selling a stock 
once and holding the position forever.  Thus, the price-level criterion is clearly less sensitive to assumptions 
about reasonable trading and information costs. 
Similarly, the price-level criterion is interesting to an investor who, for some reason, is constrained to 
a long holding period.  For example, the level of price is the appropriate measure for a host of economically  
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important decisions including firms’ real investment decisions as well as merger and acquisition activity – 
endeavors essentially requiring buy-and-hold behavior. 
Second, following Brainard, Shapiro, and Shoven (1991) we measure risk by covariances of cash-
flow fundamentals instead of covariances of stock returns.  If the objective is to test the joint hypothesis of 
market efficiency and an asset pricing model being literally true, a valid test of this joint hypothesis 
examines the relation between first and second moments of high-frequency stock returns.  However, if the 
objective is to measure how well the joint hypothesis predicts stock prices, tests relying solely on the 
properties of stock returns are handicapped by the following disadvantage.  Market inefficiencies (and/or 
mispecification of the risk model) can affect not only average returns but also return covariances, and this 
problem is likely to be more severe the higher the frequency of the returns. The price-level tests we advocate 
connect stock prices to covariances or betas of cash flows.  Regressing prices on cash-flow betas is a cleaner 
way to measure a model’s explanatory power than regressing average returns on return betas, because the 
cash-flow betas are less affected by mispricing. 
We test empirically the ability of the CAPM to explain value and growth stocks’ prices.  Our 
empirical results suggest that mispricing relative to the CAPM is not an important factor in determining the 
prices of value and growth stocks.  Cash-flow betas (measured by regressing firms’ log ROEs on the 
market’s log ROE) essentially explain the prices of and long-horizon returns on price-to-book-sorted 
portfolios, with a premium consistent with the theory. 
In addition to traditional regressions of prices and long-horizon average returns on betas, we specify a 
stochastic-discount-factor present-value model that links firms’ current price-to-book ratios to expected 
future cash flows and to covariances of future cash flows with the stochastic discount factor.  Ultimately, this 
present-value framework leads us to a cross-sectional variance decomposition of price-to-book ratios.  We 
allocate the price-to-book variance to predictable variation in three components: The risk-adjusted present 
value of cash flows, the terminal value (capturing the effects beyond our fifteen-year horizon), and a pricing-
error component (as assigned by a particular economic model).   
We examine pricing errors relative to three discount-factor models, a constant discount factor and two 
implementations of the CAPM discount factor.  If we restrict discount rates to be constant across firms, our 
decomposition allocates about 27 percent of the cross-sectional price-to-book variance to mispricing.   
However, if we allow discount rates to vary as predicted by the CAPM, the variance share of mispricing is  
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reduced to –0.1 percent.  The CAPM is a success at the price level because the present-value model detects 
more market risk in value firms’ long-term cash flows than in growth firms’. 
We confirm and extend these findings with tests on stock returns.  When we sort stocks on price-to-
book ratios, immediately after the sort the low-price-to-book portfolios have lower CAPM betas than the 
high-price-to-book portfolios.  However, this lower risk of value stocks is entirely temporary: As time since 
the sort increases, the beta of the value-stock portfolio increases while the beta of the growth-stock portfolio 
decreases.  Within ten to fifteen years, the betas of these portfolios have reached their long-run permanent 
levels, and the long-run CAPM betas of value stocks are much higher that those of growth stocks.  If an 
investor has a fifteen-year buy-and-hold investment horizon, value and growth portfolios’ average returns 
line up closely with their CAPM betas. 
Of course, the CAPM cannot explain the abnormal performance of an annually rebalanced value-
minus-growth strategy.  That strategy will have a high return and low stock-return beta, irrespective of what 
happens to those stocks after they are sold (or bought back on the short side).  However, the long-run betas 
are crucial when diagnosing the economic significance of the value-minus-growth anomaly.  We argue that, 
for many purposes, the joint hypothesis of the CAPM and market efficiency approximates the pricing of 
value and growth stocks well. 
Our results may validate what beforehand might have been seen as a common but inappropriate use of 
CAPM-based hurdle rates by firms, given the empirical evidence on the CAPM’s inability to explain one-
period expected returns.  For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) state: “It is very interesting that CFOs 
pay very little attention to risk factors based on momentum and book-to-market value.”  Our empirical 
results, like the theoretical results by Stein (1996), support the use of the CAPM in capital budgeting, as long 
as the betas are measured from cash flows or long-term stock returns.  Unlike Stein’s, however, our results 
also suggest that once a project is undertaken, the stock market values it approximately “right,” i.e., 
consistently with the model’s present-value calculation. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2001) model merger and acquisition decisions and suggest that these 
transactions are motivated by acquirers/targets being overpriced/underpriced.  Their model makes the 
implicit assumption that deviations from fundamental values are economically significant.  Our findings 
suggest that high-book-to-market “fallen angels” within industries are not necessarily obvious takeover 
targets based on their valuations alone, because the average take-over premium and other transaction costs  
 35
are an order of magnitude higher than the mispricing we detect (Bradley, 1980).  At minimum, our results 
suggest that empirical tests of this valuation motive should carefully estimate the risk-adjusted price-level 
impact of any return predictability assumed to be due to market inefficiencies. 
Our evidence is directly relevant to the interpretation of Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) empirical 
evidence on equity issues.  Based on their finding that the historical sequence of past book-to-market ratios 
forecasts the capital structure far into the future, Baker and Wurgler argue that a firm’s long-run capital 
structure is determined by the sequence of opportunistic equity-issuance and share-repurchase decisions.  
Our finding that firms’ book-to-market ratios are associated with only modest levels of relative mispricing 
suggests that the benefits from this timing activity are small.  If the benefits are small, the costs of deviating 
from the “optimal” capital structure must also be small, and the optimal capital structure must be well 
approximated by the Modigiliani-Miller (1958) irrelevancy principle.  
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Appendix: Additional robustness checks 
A.  Post-1938 period 
In unreported tests, we also examine a shorter 1938-1999 sample in tests that interpret price-to-book 
ratios on a ratio scale (e.g., regressions on the price-to-book ratios), consisting of 159,537 firm-years.  The 
logic behind this choice of periods is based on the pre-1938 level of disclosure regulation.  Before the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there was essentially no regulation to ensure the flow of accurate and 
systematic accounting information.  Among other things, the act prescribes specific annual and periodic 
reporting and record-keeping requirements for publicly-traded companies.  The companies required to file 
reports with the SEC must also "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposition of the assets of the issuer.”  In addition, the 
legislation introduces the concept of “an independent public or certified accountant” to certify financial 
statements and imposes statutory liabilities on accountants.  Clearly, interpreting the book-equity predating 
the act on the same ratio scale as more recent data would be unrealistic.  
Merino and Mayper (1999) provide statistics on the enforcement of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act.  The SEC began 279 proceedings in the first ten years of the enforcement of the 1934 act, and 272 of 
those proceedings were begun in the 1933-37 period and only seven in the subsequent five-year period.  This 
decline in proceedings may signal increasing compliance by registrants or declining interest by the SEC in 
regulatory enforcement.  We believe the former cause was the driving force behind the reduced number of 
new proceedings.  In our opinion, it is reasonable to characterize the 1934-1937 period as an initial 
enforcement period, after which reporting conventions have converged to their steady states. 
The results for the 1938-1999 subperiod are available by request.  The cash-flow-beta regressions 
estimated from the 1938-1999 subsample are similar to those obtained from the full sample.  The main 
difference is that in the shorter subsample, the spread in cash-flow betas is stronger immediately after the 
sort but weaker at fifteen-year horizon than in the full sample.  The main difference between the 1928-1999 
and 1938-1999 variance-decomposition results is that the stock-return CAPM does slightly better at the 
fifteen-year horizon in the shorter subsample.  
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B.  OLS variance decomposition 
We also estimated the regression equation (14) with OLS. Although common sense dictates some 
weighting scheme similar to ours, due to their simplicity we also present the estimated OLS regressions, 
specified exactly as in equation (14).  The OLS results are generally consistent with the WLS results.  Our 
main conclusions are also robust to omitting the time dummies from the WLS specification and thereby 
allowing the time-series variation to affect the parameter estimates, as well as to reasonable alterations of the 
WLS weighting scheme.  
The results from the simple OLS regressions (equation (14)) are available by request.  As the horizon 
increases, the variance share of cash flows increases from 2.1 percent at the one-year horizon to 12.4 percent 
at the fifteen-year horizon.  The mispricing component of the constant-discount-factor model also grows as 
the regressions’ horizon lengthens: The variance share of mispricing increases from 4.4 percent at the one-
year horizon to 48.7 percent at the fifteen-year horizon.   
The difference between the constant-discount-rate results in WLS and OLS specifications at the 
fifteen-year horizon is due to the time dummies.  From the empirical results by Vuolteenaho (2001) we know 
that the time-series variation in the aggregate book-to-market ratio is almost exclusively due to expected-
return effects.  Time dummies in Table IV suck up this aggregate time-series variation and the remaining 
cross-sectional variation is mostly due to cash-flow effects, as documented by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho 
(2002).   
For the OLS variance decomposition and the stock-return CAPM, the variance share of cash flows 
increases from 0.9 percent at the one-year horizon to 25.9 percent at the fifteen-year horizon.  The 
mispricing share of stock-return CAPM also increases: At the fifteen-year horizon, the stock-return CAPM 
allocates 28.8 percent to mispricing, which is less than for the constant discount rate model.  The cash-flow 
CAPM is our most successful specification in OLS regressions as well.  At fifteen-year horizon, the cash-
flow CAPM allocates 7.7 percent in OLS regressions to mispricing.  
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Table I: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the raw data. ME is market value of equity, BE  book 
value of equity, and D dividends.  Data are annual, except monthly net stock returns, and in nominal 
terms.  The sample period is 1928-2000 (208,804 firm-years). 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for price-to-book-sorted decile portfolios.  The portfolios are 
formed by sorting stocks each year on MEt-1 / BEt-1 and then following each sort for fifteen years.   
“Annual stock return” is the average one-year net stock return immediately after the sort.  “5-year stock 
return” is the average cumulative five-year net stock return to buying the portfolios and holding them for 
five years after the sort.  “15-year stock return” is the average cumulative net fifteen-year stock return to 
buying the portfolios and holding them for fifteen years after the sort.  (BEt+n - BEt-1) / BEt-1 is the average 
n-year growth in the buy-and-hold portfolios’ book values of equity.  All quantities are nominal. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the raw data 









Monthly stock return  0.012  0.175 -0.211  -0.063 0.000 0.070 0.258 
Annual stock return  0.155  0.709 -0.613  -0.198 0.063 0.360 1.147 
MEt-1 / BEt-1  2.884 5.917 0.393 0.836 1.417 2.664 9.147 
Dt-1 / MEt-1  0.022 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.036 0.077 
(MEt - MEt-1) / MEt-1  0.200 1.136 -0.606  -0.201 0.054 0.369 1.320 




Panel B: Means of selected variables for price-to-book-sorted portfolios 
Variable  High 
ME/BE  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Low 
ME/BE 
MEt-1 / BEt-1  6.219 3.201 2.221 1.721 1.399 1.169 0.973 0.807 0.638 0.409 
MEt / BEt  5.306 3.080 2.131 1.716 1.410 1.181 1.009 0.845 0.693 0.475 
MEt+4 / BEt+4  4.033 2.792 1.957 1.629 1.436 1.215 1.055 0.923 0.831 0.648 
MEt+14 / BEt+14  3.002 2.339 1.715 1.588 1.398 1.302 1.155 1.140 1.063 0.914 
Annual stock return  0.125  0.148  0.125 0.135 0.143 0.146 0.178 0.175 0.215 0.217 
5-year stock return  0.738  0.871  0.771 0.861 0.908 0.989 1.051 1.087 1.379 1.419 
15-year stock return  4.397  5.154  4.563 5.228 5.553  5.92  6.148 6.563 7.004 6.700 
(BEt+1 - BEt-1) / BEt-1  0.244 0.127 0.116 0.088 0.078 0.067 0.053 0.045 0.026 -0.019 
(BEt+4 - BEt-1) / BEt-1  0.857 0.504 0.431 0.380 0.333 0.299 0.257 0.216 0.164 0.041 




Table II: Cash-flow betas 
The table reports the estimated cash-flow betas for value and growth stocks and the regression 
coefficients and the R
2 of the regression of the expected-return component of price on cash-flow betas for 
different sets of portfolios.  The sample period is 1928-1999.  
Panel A column one shows the horizon N.  Panel A columns 2-11 report the estimated cash-flow 
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where k denotes the decile portfolio, M the market portfolio, and ROE a portfolio’s aggregate clean-
surplus earnings divided by the beginning-of-the-year aggregate book equity.  ρ is a constant equal to 
0.95.  Panel A column twelve reports the cash-flow beta of decile one minus that of decile ten.  Panel A 
column thirteen reports the cash-flow beta of average of deciles one, two, and three minus that of the 
average of deciles eight, nine, and ten. 
Panel A columns 14-16 show the intercept, slope and R
2 of a cross-sectional regression of the 
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where Rk,t,j  is the year t simple (net) return on decile portfolio k during the jth year from the sort and  k , 1 ˆ β  
the estimated cash-flow beta.  E ˆ denotes the sample mean.  Panel A columns 14-16 use thirty price-to-
book sorted portfolios as test assets.  
Panel B column one shows the alternative cash-flow definitions used in computing cash-flow betas 
at the five-year horizon.  X is earnings, ME market value of equity, and  d ∆  log dividend growth rate.  
Panel B columns 2-11 correspond to price-to-book-sorted portfolios. Panel B column twelve reports the 
cash-flow beta of decile one minus that of decile ten.  Panel B column thirteen reports the cash-flow beta 
of average of deciles one, two, and three minus that of the average of deciles eight, nine, and ten.  
All regressions are estimated with OLS.  GMM standard errors computed using the Newey-West 
formula with N leads and lags (which account for both the estimation uncertainty of the cash-flow betas 
and for the cross-sectional and time-series correlation of the error terms) are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Panel A: Cash-flow betas and premia 
 
N  High 
ME/BE  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Low 
ME/BE  1-10  (1,2,3) - 
(8,9,10)  λ0  λ1  R2 % 










































































































































































Panel B: Alternative cash-flow definitions 
 
Alternative cash-flow 
definition (N = 5) 
High 
ME/BE  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Low 
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Table III: Estimated parameters of stochastic discount factors 
This table reports the estimated parameters of three stochastic-discount-factor models.  The first 
model,  t t t t Q Q π δπ / / 1 1 − − = , is a constant real discount factor, δ , times the ratio of price levels,  t t π π / 1 − .  
The parameter estimates with standard errors for the constant-discount-rate model are reported in second 
column of the table.   
The second model is the stock-return CAPM:  t t t t t RMRF Q Q π π γ γ / ) ( / 1 1 0 1 − − + = . This stochastic 
discount factor is a linear function of the excess stock return on the value-weight market portfolio 
) ( 1 0 t RMRF γ γ +  times the ratio of price levels.  The third and fourth columns report the parameter 
estimates with standard errors. 
The fifth and sixth columns show some implications of the stock-return CAPM parameter 
estimates.  The fifth column shows the implied average price of a real risk-free one-period discount bond, 
and the sixth column the implied average RMRF.  These implied statistics are computed by adding two 
additional moment conditions (one for mean RMRF and another for mean squared RMRF) to the system 
and using the formulas  ) ( 1 0 RMRF E γ γ +  and  )] ( /[ ) var(   1 0 1 RMRF E RMRF γ γ γ + − .   
The seventh and eight columns show the parameter estimates of the third model, the cash-flow 
CAPM:  t t
real
t M t t ROE g g Q Q π π / )] 1 log( [ / 1 , 1 0 1 − − + + = , where 
real
t M ROE ,  is the market portfolio’s aggregate 
real clean-surplus earnings for year t divided by the beginning of the year t aggregate real book equity.  
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The moment condition (1) is omitted from the system used to estimate the constant-discount-rate model.  
Above,  rf R  is the net nominally risk-free interest rate, ME is market value of equity,  A abnormal 
earnings,  BE  book equity, and Q  the cumulative stochastic discount factor.  Subscripts k and t are 
indices to portfolios and time, respectively.   b denotes the generic stochastic-discount-factor parameter 
vector.  The first column of the table reports  N , the horizon used in the price-to-book restrictions. 
The portfolios used as test assets in the price-to-book moment conditions are formed by sorting 
stocks into ten value-weight portfolios based on their price-to-book ratios.  After sorting, we follow the 
market and book values as well as abnormal earnings for the portfolios up to fifteen years after portfolio 
formation.  The sample period is 1928-1999 and all data and parameters are in annual terms.  
GMM standard errors computed using the Newey-West formula with N leads and lags, which 
account for both the estimation uncertainty of the cash-flow betas and for the cross-sectional and time-




Horizon:   Constant 
discount rate:    Stock-return CAPM 
stochastic discount factor:    Implications of stock-return 
CAPM’s parameters:    Cash-flow CAPM 
stochastic discount factor: 
N   δˆ     0 ˆ γ   1 ˆ γ    
real rf R E
, 1
1
+   ) (RMRF E
 
  0 ˆ g   1 ˆ g  
1  0.9193 
(0.0189)    1.0703 
(0.0765) 
-1.3327 
(0.5917)    0.9436 
(0.0241) 
0.0898 




2  0.9177 
(0.0167)    1.0766 
(0.0805) 
-1.4156 
(0.6623)    0.9448 
(0.0191) 
0.0952 




3  0.9178 
(0.0159)    1.0714 
(0.0782) 
-1.3485 
(0.6577)    0.9472 
(0.0153) 
0.0919 




5  0.9171 
(0.0135)    1.0500 
(0.0612) 
-1.1680 
(0.5270)    0.9455 
(0.0126) 
0.0825 




10  0.9237 
(0.0141)    1.0309 
(0.0564) 
-1.0251 
(0.5668)    0.9360 
(0.0149) 
0.0794 




15  0.9272  
(0.0131)    1.0167 
(0.0493) 
-0.9020 
(0.5091)    0.9355 
(0.0163) 
0.0746 






 Table IV: Cross-sectional WLS variance decomposition of price-to-book ratios 
This table reports three sets of variance-decomposition regressions.  The variance-decomposition 
regressions are estimated by separately regressing the three components of the price-to-book ratios on the 
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Above,  ME is the market value of equity,  A ˆ  estimated abnormal earnings, BE  book equity, DT  matrix 
of time dummies, Q ˆ  cumulative stochastic discount factor, and ε ˆ estimated realized pricing error.   
∑ = − − =
t
t t k t k k BE ME T w
1 1 , 1 , ) / ( ) / 1 (.   Q ˆ  and ε ˆ are computed using the parameter estimates from Table 
III.  Subscripts k and t are indices to portfolios and time, respectively. 
The first column of the table shows  N , the horizon used in computing the dependent variables of 
the regressions.  The columns 2-4 show the WLS regression coefficients for the dependent variables 
constructed using the constant discount factor.  The columns 5-7 show the results for the stock-return 
CAPM,  t t t t t RMRF Q Q π π γ γ / ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ / ˆ
1 1 0 1 − − + = , where RMRF is the excess return on the value-weight 
market portfolio.  Columns 8-10 show the results for the cash-flow CAPM, 
t t
real
t M t t ROE g g Q Q π π / )] 1 log( [ / 1 , 1 0 1 − − + + = , where 
real
t M ROE ,  is the market portfolio’s real ROE. 
The portfolios used as test assets are formed by sorting stocks into ten value-weight portfolios 
based on the price-to-book ratios and cover the period 1928-1999.  After sorting, we follow the market 
and book values as well as abnormal earnings for the portfolios up to fifteen years after the portfolio 
formation.  Standard errors (in parentheses) account for both the estimation uncertainty of the stochastic-
discount-factor parameters and for the cross-sectional and time-series correlation of the errors. 
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Table V: Parametric model of beta evolution 
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TREND is a linear time trend in centuries (month index divided by 1200), normalized to zero in the 
middle of the sample.  YEARS is the number of years from the sort divided by one hundred, or more 
accurately the number of lags we used in firms’ price-to-book ratios when sorting the portfolios into 
deciles divided by one hundred.  RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio.  L is the number of 
monthly RMRF lags included in the regressions.  The table reports the sums of coefficients for value, 
growth and value-minus-growth portfolios: 
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The dependent variables are constructed as follows.  We first sort stocks into price-to-book deciles.  
Every year, we run fifteen different sorts: Deciles sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, deciles sorted 
on year-t-2 price-to-book ratios,…, and deciles sorted on year-t-15 price-to-book ratios.  As a result, we 
have 715 months of returns on 150 portfolios for the period 6/1941-12/2000 (the maximum period for 
which our data made it possible to compute the fifteen-years-from-the-sort portfolio). The dependent 
variables in the regressions are an equal-weight portfolio of the three value-weight lowest-price-to-book 
deciles (Panel A), an equal-weight portfolio of the three value-weight highest-price-to-book deciles 
(Panel B), and the difference of the two (Panel C).  
 
 
Panel A:  Value 
Lags of RMRF (L): 0 1 2 5  11 
b(intercept) 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04  1.01 
standard error  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04  0.05 
t-statistic 62.79 46.28 38.65 28.11  19.06 
b(trend) -1.01 -1.08 -1.19 -0.95  -0.96 
standard error  0.09 0.13 0.15 0.20  0.26 
t-statistic -10.76 -8.62 -8.00 -4.77  -3.74 
b(time from sort)  0.50 0.55 0.56 0.79  0.78 
standard error  0.11 0.14 0.17 0.24  0.34 
t-statistic 4.68 3.80 3.24 3.28  2.26 
b(time from sort * trend)  1.51 2.60 3.01 3.03  3.86 
standard error  0.61 0.81 0.96 1.29  1.66 
t-statistic 2.49 3.21 3.15 2.35  2.33 
 
Panel B:  Growth 
Lags of RMRF (L): 0 1 2 5  11 
b(intercept) 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.01  0.99 
standard error  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.03 
t-statistic 115.82 85.30 69.91 49.43  33.71 
b(trend) 0.28 0.38 0.48 0.55  0.68 
standard error  0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11  0.14 
t-statistic 5.38 5.47 5.92 4.97  4.83 
b(time from sort)  -0.62 -0.79 -0.80 -0.69  -0.54 
standard error  0.07 0.09 0.11 0.15  0.22 
t-statistic -9.22 -8.66 -7.23 -4.52  -2.47 
b(time from sort * trend)  -1.63 -2.01 -2.28 -2.14  -1.07 
standard error  0.39 0.52 0.61 0.82  1.05 
t-statistic -4.21 -3.89 -3.75 -2.60  -1.02 
 
Panel C:  Difference (value minus growth) 
Lags of RMRF (L): 0 1 2 5  11 
b(intercept) -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03  0.02 
standard error  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05  0.07 
t-statistic -0.93 -0.57 0.18 0.63  0.34 
b(trend) -1.29 -1.46 -1.67 -1.50  -1.64 
standard error  0.13 0.17 0.20 0.27  0.34 
t-statistic -10.22 -8.67 -8.40 -5.58  -4.75 
b(time from sort)  1.12 1.34 1.36 1.48  1.31 
standard error  0.14 0.18 0.22 0.31  0.44 
t-statistic 8.27 7.30 6.15 4.83  3.01 
b(time from sort * trend)  3.13 4.61 5.30 5.17  4.93 
standard error  0.77 1.03 1.22 1.65  2.11 
t-statistic 4.05 4.46 4.34 3.14  2.34 
  
 
Table VI: Calendar-time portfolio returns 
This table reports stock-return-based tests for different investment horizons.  We first sort stocks 
into price-to-book deciles and then calculate the value-weight monthly returns on each decile over the 
next fifteen years (without re-sorting the stocks).  We define the N-year decile M as a portfolio strategy 
that invests equally in N portfolios: Decile M sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, decile M sorted on 
year-t-2 price-to-book ratios,…, and decile M sorted on year-t-N price-to-book ratios. We extend the 
“holding periods” (i.e., N) out to fifteen years.  The final sample has 715 months of returns on 150 
portfolios for the period 6/1941-12/2000. 
Column two reports the GRS statistic testing the intercepts in regressions of the monthly excess 
returns on these ten N-year deciles on the excess market stock return and eleven lags of the excess market 
stock return.  Column three reports the mean of a strategy that goes long the top three decile portfolios 
(low price-to-book) and shorts the bottom three decile portfolios (high price-to-book).  Column four 
reports the alpha in regressions of this portfolio on the excess market return and eleven lags.  Columns 
five and six report the intercept and coefficient of a cross-sectional regression of the average returns on 
the ten N-year decile portfolios on the total betas of those portfolios.  We construct total betas by 
summing the individual partial betas on the excess market return and eleven lags of the excess market 
return.  Column seven reports the (unadjusted) R
2 from that cross-sectional regression.   
Standard errors are in parentheses except in column two where we report the probability value 
associated with the GRS statistic in brackets.  We provide bootstrapped probability values in braces under 
the null hypothesis that the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is true except in column three where the null 
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Table VII: Premium on cash-flow beta estimated from alternative test assets 
The table reports the regression coefficients and the R
2 of the regression of the expected-return 
component of price on cash-flow betas for different sets of portfolios.  Columns 2-4 use thirty price-to-
book-sorted portfolios and thirty portfolios sorted on five-year OLS stock-return betas.  Columns 5-7 use 
thirty price-to-book-sorted portfolios and thirty size-sorted portfolios.  Betas are estimated from the full 
1928-1999 sample, except for the beta-sorted portfolios, for which the cash-flow beta estimation period is 
1933-1999.  Footnotes in Table II apply. 
 
  30 ME/BE-sorted portfolios and  
30 beta-sorted portfolios 
30 ME/BE-sorted portfolios and  
30 size-sorted portfolios 
N  λ0  λ1  R2 %  λ0  λ1  R2 % 
1  0.130 
(0.028) 
0.024 
(0.013)  12.10  0.139 
(0.041) 
0.029 
(0.017)  5.15 
2  0.113 
(0.023) 
0.042 
(0.017)  27.77  0.086 
(0.044) 
0.079 
(0.038)  39.10 
3  0.101 
(0.019) 
0.057 
(0.019)  36.65  0.078 
(0.031) 
0.087 
(0.036)  51.65 
5  0.090 
(0.022) 
0.069 
(0.022)  54.09  0.094 
(0.029) 
0.075 
(0.031)  62.54 
10  0.079 
(0.018) 
0.073 
(0.018)  51.21  0.079 
(0.034) 
0.076 
(0.036)  60.40 
15  0.104 
(0.020) 
0.047 
(0.021)  23.17  0.073 
(0.031) 
0.081 
(0.036)  51.49 
  
 
Table VIII: Present-value tests with alternative test assets 
The table reports the WLS variance decompositions for different sets of portfolios.  Panel A uses 
ten price-to-book-sorted portfolios and ten portfolios sorted on five-year OLS stock-return betas (period 
1933-1999).  Panel B uses thirty price-to-book-sorted portfolios and thirty size-sorted portfolios (period 
1928-1999).  Footnotes in Table IV apply. 
 
Panel A: Ten ME/BE-sorted portfolios and ten beta-sorted portfolios 
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Panel B: Ten ME/BE-sorted portfolios and ten size-sorted portfolios 
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 Table IX: Calendar-time portfolio-return tests with alternative test assets 
This table reports stock-return-based tests for different investment horizons and for different test-
asset sets.  We first sort stocks into deciles (based on ME/BE, size, or estimated stock-return beta) and 
then calculate the value-weight monthly returns on each decile over the next fifteen years (without re-
sorting the stocks).  We define the N-year decile M as a portfolio strategy that invests equally in N 
portfolios: Decile M sorted on year-t-1 characteristic, decile M sorted on year-t-2 characteristic,…, and 
decile M sorted on year-t-N characteristic. We extend the “holding periods” (i.e., N) out to fifteen years. 
The final sample has 655 months of returns on 300 portfolios in each panel (450 in total) for the period 
6/1946-12/2000. 
The GRS column reports the GRS-statistic testing the intercepts in regressions of the monthly 
excess returns on these ten N-year deciles on the excess market stock return and eleven lags of the excess 
market stock return.  Columns  0 λ  and  1 λ  report the intercept and coefficient of a cross-sectional 
regression of the average returns on the total betas of the portfolios.  We construct total betas by summing 
the individual partial betas on the excess market return and eleven lags of the excess market return.  
Column labeled 
2 R  reports the (unadjusted) regression R
2 from that cross-sectional regression.   
Standard errors are in parentheses except in the GRS column where we report the probability value 
associated with the GRS statistic in brackets.  We provide bootstrapped probability values in braces under 
the null hypothesis that the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is true. 
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Figure 1: Variance shares for the stock-return CAPM 
This figure graphs the variance shares from Table IV columns 5-7 as a function of the horizon N.  
The lightly colored area in the bottom represents the variance share of risk-adjusted cash flows, the white 
area in the middle the share of the terminal value, and the dark area in the top the share of pricing errors; 
all relative to the stock-return CAPM.  The thin dashed lines denote +/- one-standard-error bounds.  For 
comparison purposes, the variance shares from the constant-discount-rate model (Table IV columns 2-4) 
are plotted with bold dashed lines.   
The portfolios used as test assets are formed by sorting stocks into ten value-weight portfolios 
based on their price-to-book ratios.  After sorting, we follow the market and book values as well as 
abnormal earnings for the portfolios up to fifteen years after the portfolio formation.  The sample period 
is 1928-1999 and all data are annual.   
 
Figure 2: Variance shares for the cash-flow CAPM 
This figure graphs the variance shares from Table IV columns 8-10 as a function of the horizon N.  
The lightly colored area in the bottom represents the variance share of risk-adjusted cash flows, the white 
area in the middle the share of the terminal value, and the dark area in the top the share of pricing errors; 
all relative to the cash-flow CAPM.  The thin dashed lines denote +/- one-standard-error bounds.  For 
comparison purposes, the variance shares from the constant-discount-rate model (Table IV columns 2-4) 
are plotted with bold dashed lines.   
The portfolios used as test assets are formed by sorting stocks into ten value-weight portfolios 
based on their price-to-book ratios.  After sorting, we follow the market and book values as well as 
abnormal earnings for the portfolios up to fifteen years after the portfolio formation.  The sample period 
is 1928-1999 and all data are annual.   
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the CAPM beta after portfolio formation 
This figure shows the evolution of the total CAPM beta for value and growth stocks after portfolio 
formation.  We first sort stocks into price-to-book deciles.  Every year, we run fifteen different sorts: 
Deciles sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, deciles sorted on year-t-2 price-to-book ratios,…, and 
deciles sorted on year-t-15 price-to-book ratios.  As a result, we have 715 months of returns on 150 
portfolios for the period 6/1941-12/2000 (the maximum period for which our data made it possible to 
compute the fifteen-years-from-the-sort portfolio). 
We compute our measure of risk by regressing the monthly returns on the portfolios on the 
contemporaneous and lagged market returns.  We then sum the regression coefficients for each dependent 
variable to obtain what we call “total beta.”  The upper-left plot is produced with no lagged market 
returns in the regressions, the upper-right with one lag, the lower-left with five lags, and the lower-right 
with eleven lags.  The dependent variables in the regressions are an equal-weight portfolio of the three 
value-weight lowest-price-to-book deciles and an equal-weight portfolio of the three value-weight 
highest-price-to-book deciles.  The total beta of value stocks is plotted with a solid line and triangles and 
the total beta of growth stocks with just a solid line.  The dashed lines show one-standard-error bounds. 
 
Figure 4: Mean excess returns and alphas for different holding periods 
This figure shows annualized average excess returns (top graph) and alphas (bottom graph) on 
deciles for up to N-year holding period.  We first sort stocks into price-to-book deciles.  Every year, we 
run fifteen different sorts: Deciles sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, deciles sorted on year-t-2 price-
to-book ratios,…, and deciles sorted on year-t-15 price-to-book ratios.  As a result, we have 715 months 
of returns on 150 portfolios for the period 6/1941-12/2000.  We define the N-year decile M as a portfolio 
strategy that invests equally in N portfolios: Decile M sorted on year-t-1 price-to-book ratios, decile M  
 
sorted on year-t-2 price-to-book ratios,…, and decile M sorted on year-t-N price-to-book ratios.  The 
height of the column corresponds to 1200 times the mean excess return in the top graph and to 1200 times 
the intercept of a regression of the monthly excess returns on the contemporaneous excess market return 
and eleven lags of the excess market return in the bottom graph. 
 Figure 1: Variance shares for the stock-return CAPM






































1Figure 2: Variance shares for the cash-flow CAPM







































































Year after portfolio formation
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Figure 3: Evolution of CAPM beta after portfolio formation
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